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Abstract:  Habitat fragmentation is widely considered a primary threat to biodiversity. This paper 
develops a theoretical model of land use to analyze the optimal conservation of landscapes when 
land quality is spatially heterogeneous and wildlife habitat is fragmented and socially valuable. 
When agriculture is the primary cause of fragmentation, we show that reforestation efforts 
should be targeted to the most fragmented landscapes with an aggregate share of forest equal to a 
threshold, defined by the ratio of the opportunity cost of conversion to the social value of core 
forest.  When urban development is the primary cause of fragmentation, we show how spatial 
heterogeneity in amenities and household neighbor preferences affect the optimal landscape and 
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It has been widely recognized that it is not just the amount of habitat that matters for the 
persistence of wildlife species, but the spatial location of habitat and its degree of fragmentation 
(Armsworth et al. 2004).  The fragmentation of forestland is perceived as a threat to terrestrial 
biodiversity (Askins 2002, Faaborg 2002) and occurs when an originally contiguous tract of 
forest becomes separated into isolated patches by human land-use conversion.  While there are 
many ways to quantify the extent of habitat fragmentation on a particular landscape, it is widely 
recognized in the biological literature that a patch of habitat bordered by a patch of land in some 
alternative use will potentially suffer a negative spatial externality referred to as an edge effect 
(Temple and Cary 1988, Paton 1994, Van Horn 1995).  When a forest ends and a field begins, or 
where a patch of grassland ends and a house lot begins, there is an edge
1.  The edge effect on 
forest habitat typically declines as one gets further from the nearest edge
2.  Parcels of forestland 
which are greater than some specified distance from an edge are often labeled as core forest and 
provide the best habitat for many sensitive species (Askins 2002, Robbins et al. 1989, Robinson 
et al. 1995).  Recent GIS analyses have concluded that 62% of continental U.S. forestland is less 
than 150m from the nearest non-forest edge, and therefore fragmentation related to edge-effects 
is pervasive and ecologically significant on U.S. forest habitat (Riiters et al. 2002).  
In this paper we develop a theoretical model to analyze optimal landscape conservation in 
the presence of spatial externalities associated with habitat fragmentation. In particular, our focus 
                                                 
1 Edge-effects are known to influence the quality of breeding habitat for species such as birds.  For example, 
potential externalities that impact forest birds from non-forest habitat include parasitism (e.g. from Cowbirds) and 
increased predation (from house cats, raccoons, snakes, etc.). 
2 Research indicates that edge-effects on birds may extend from a distance of 50 m (Paton 1994) to 300 m (Van 
Horn et al. 1995).   is on analyzing conservation policies to increase core forest and reduce edge effects. While there 
is an extensive literature on the ecological consequences of fragmentation, an economic 
understanding of policies to mitigate fragmentation is not well developed.
3  This paper examines 
the effects of spatial externalities on optimal landscape conservation in the classical tradition: a) 
the choice of land use on any particular parcel depends on the quality of that parcel, and b) land 
quality is heterogeneous across the landscape.  Land quality affects market returns to land and 
can include parcel-specific attributes such as distance to an urban center or soil quality.  Land 
parcels are also assumed to produce non-market benefits which are a function of the amount and 
spatial pattern of forestland on the landscape.  The optimal landscape is the spatial pattern of 
land use which maximizes the sum of market and non-market values from the landscape as a 
whole.  
 When urban development is the primary cause of forest fragmentation, distance to urban 
centers and distance to amenities are assumed to be the primary determinants of land quality and 
returns to development (Capozza and Helsley 1989, Wu and Plantinga 2003, Turner 2004).  In 
the urban economics literature such distances are typically assumed to be observable.   When 
agriculture is the primary cause of fragmentation, regulators rarely have complete information on 
parcel-level land quality because land quality is not necessarily based on observable distance to 
cities or amenities. Soil quality is one of the most important attributes of land quality for 
agricultural and forestland (Plantinga 1996).  Soil quality is driven by exogenous geologic 
factors and there are numerous potential configurations of parcel-level soil quality that will not 
necessarily resemble the smooth monotonic functions describing urban land quality.  There may 
                                                 
3 One exception is Smith and Shogren (2002), who propose an incentive mechanism for endangered species 
protection that yields a bonus payment (e.g. an agglomeration bonus) for the creation of contiguous habitat across 
property lines.  However, Smith and Shogren focus on analyzing the design of the agglomeration bonus contract 
rather than the optimal degree of conservation on a landscape with habitat fragmentation.   also be individual-specific attributes which will be unobserved by the regulator and which may 
affect the quality of the parcel for forest and agriculture
4.  With these considerations, we analyze 
optimal landscape conservation by developing separate models for the cases when urban 
development and agriculture are the primary cause of fragmentation. 
We explore the optimal reforestation strategy on agricultural landscapes when regulators 
have incomplete information on land quality and where the regulator can control the total amount 
of reforestation but not its exact location.  Under these assumptions, we show that it’s optimal to 
either a) convert all agricultural parcels to forest, or b) reforest none of the market equilibrium 
landscape.  This corner solution arises because the spatial relationships which influence 
fragmentation yield marginal forest benefits which are increasing and convex in the amount of 
afforestation on the landscape.  We also show that the net social benefits of the optimal 
reforestation strategy vary significantly across market equilibrium landscapes with different 
amounts of forest and different degrees of fragmentation.  In general, efforts to reduce 
fragmentation should be targeted to the most fragmented landscapes with an aggregate share of 
forest equal to a threshold, defined by the ratio of the opportunity cost of conversion to the social 
value of core forest.   
We draw on the urban economics literature to analyze the optimal urban landscape under 
two alternative assumptions of the spatial configuration of land quality: a) a central city with 
spatial heterogeneity in amenities, and b) a central city with neighbor preferences.  We define the 
conditions under which fragmentation in land use is economically optimal and develop 
incentive-based policies to achieve the optimal landscape.  We show that while a simple 
spatially-uniform Pigouvian incentive is optimal on very simple landscapes, this policy is not 
generally optimal when amenities are not uniform across the landscape or when people prefer to 
                                                 
4 For example, individual landowners may have different levels of managerial expertise regarding forestry. live near open space.  We define incentive policies for achieving the optimal landscape in these 
cases. 
There is a relatively small theoretical literature on land use patterns and spatial 
externalities.  Parker (2000) and Saak (2004) develop agent-based models to analyze private and 
socially-optimal land use patterns in agricultural settings under spatial externalities.  Albers 
(1995) and Swallow et al. (1997) develop models of spatial externalities on forestland.  In the 
ecology literature, optimization techniques have been applied to the problem of optimally 
arranging the spatial allocation of wildlife habitat (Hof and Bevers 2002, Hof and Raphael 1997).  
There is also a set of papers in the urban economics literature which relax the featureless plain 
assumption of central city models and focus on urban spatial structure and open space amenities 
(Wu and Plantinga 2003, Walsh 2004, Turner 2004).   
This paper makes two primary contributions to the literature.  First, this paper analyzes 
the optimal spatial structure of land use under multiple assumptions of the spatial structure of 
land quality.  The previous literature either assumes land quality is homogeneous (Albers 1995, 
Parker 2000, Saak 2004) assumes only one specific spatial structure of land quality (Turner 
2004), or doesn’t account for land quality (Hof and Bevers 2002, Hof and Raphael 1997).  
Second, we propose an optimal conservation strategy when agriculture is the primary cause of 
fragmentation and we derive simple incentive schemes for achieving the optimal landscape when 
urban development is the primary cause of fragmentation.  Optimal policies to address 
fragmentation issues have not been modeled explicitly in the previous literature, but have been 
recognized as an important topic of research in environmental economics (Deacon et al. 1998).    2. Model Set-Up 
  Consider a landscape along a one-dimensional line of length N.  A one-dimensional 
landscape is considered in this paper to simplify the analysis, although the results are applicable 
to two-dimensions.  For simplicity, the landscape is broken into N discrete parcels, each of equal 
length l. Each parcel has a measure of land quality q associated with it, which affects the 
potential market returns to various uses of the parcel.  Land quality q encompasses all factors 
that affect market returns from the land.  For example, q could represent the distance from a city 
center and environmental amenities, which are potential determinants of returns to developed 
land.  Also, q could represent soil quality, which is a determinant of returns to agricultural and 
forest land.  Land quality is assumed to be homogeneous within a parcel and heterogeneous 
across parcels.   
2.1 Market and Non-Market Returns to Land 
We assume that there are two distinct uses to which each parcel can be devoted: forest (f) 
and an alternative use (a), such as agriculture or urban.  The market-based net returns to uses f 
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*).  Without loss of generality, we assume that the landscape is bordered by a 
parcel in F at one end and by a parcel in A at the other end. 
  Land use also generates non-market benefits or costs.  We assume that parcels in the 
alternative use produce an ‘edge-effect’ that extends for the length of one parcel.  Therefore, 
forest parcels which are surrounded on both sides are considered core, while all other forest parcels are considered edge.  Let δi be the proportion of parcel i in forested use, where 0≤ δi ≤1.  
The core habitat benefits to parcel i (Bi) can be formally defined as: 
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The total core benefits on landscape L are defined as ∑ + − =
i
i i i i B L TB ) , , ( ) ( 1 1 δ δ δ . The value of 
any particular parcel in forest depends on the land use of its immediate neighbors. Further, 
define { n L } δ δ δ ,...., , 2 1 =  as a landscape.  Fragmentation in land use is formally defined as 
follows:  
Definition: Fragmentation in use f occurs on landscape L if and only if there exists a 
L k j i ∈ δ δ δ , , such that 0 , > k i δ δ , 1 < j δ , and i<j<k. 
 
In words, fragmentation in use f occurs if there are two parcels i and k with positive amounts of 
forest, which are not fully connected by forested parcels.  If use f is not fragmented then we 
consider it to be contiguous. As defined above, the measure of fragmentation used in this paper is 
core forest.  According to the following lemma, the total core benefit TB on the landscape is 
maximized when there is no fragmentation in use f. 
Lemma: Given a landscape with total forest area Nf, total core benefits, TB, are maximized when 
L has no fragmentation in f. The maximum total core benefits for area Nf, is given by TB
* = Nf – 
1. 
 
Proof: See appendix. 
By definition, TB is inversely related to fragmentation, where high levels of TB indicate low 
levels of fragmentation while low levels of TB indicate high levels of fragmentation.  
2.2 Equilibrium and Optimal Landscapes 
  The objective of private landowners is to select a use for their land to maximize profits, 
while the objective of a regulator is to maximize the sum of profits and core forest benefits over 
the landscape by selecting the optimal use for each parcel δi.  In this framework wildlife benefits are considered public goods and do not enter the decision calculus of private landowners. 
Suppose landowners make land-use decisions based on the expected market returns to land.  A 
parcel will be allocated to forest if  () ()
fa
ii R qR q ≥  and to agriculture if () ()
af
ii R qR q > .  Given 
the assumptions about the profit functions, all land with quality below   is allocated to forest, 
and all land with q above  is allocated to the alternative use. The range of land quality is 





* are not clustered together, private land use decisions will result in fragmentation and 
loss of core benefits.  Since land quality determines the profitability of land, and the spatial 
configuration of forestland determines the non-market returns from the landscape, then the 
spatial configuration of land quality will determine the optimal landscape. Section 3 explores 
optimal conservation when agriculture is the primary cause of forest fragmentation while section 
4 explores the optimal landscape with urban development being the primary cause of forest 
fragmentation.   
3. Optimal Conservation on Forest Landscapes with Agriculture 
  In this section we consider the optimal conservation strategy when agriculture is the 
primary cause of forest fragmentation.  We assume that the regulator knows the distribution of 
land quality, f(q), but does not have parcel-specific information on land quality.  Most major 
U.S. conservation programs on agricultural lands are voluntary and offer a subsidy to farmers 
who adopt conservation practices or retire land from production.  When regulators don’t know 
the spatial configuration of land quality, they won’t know the exact location of restored 
forestland under incentive-based land-use policies.  This section assumes that the regulator can 
control the total amount of reforestation on agricultural land by adjusting the subsidy level but 
cannot control the exact location where reforestation will occur.  Under these assumptions, we examine the following two questions.  First, given the aggregate amount and spatial 
configuration of forestland, how much reforestation should the regulator choose on a given 
landscape?  Second, across multiple equilibrium landscapes with different amounts of forest and 
different levels of fragmentation, which types of landscapes should the regulator target first to 
maximize the social benefits of reducing fragmentation?  
3.1 Optimal Reforestation 
If the regulator can observe the equilibrium share of forest and agricultural land on a 
landscape then they can infer the share of high and low quality land on that landscape. This is 
because high quality land (q>q
*) is allocated to agriculture and low quality land (q≤q
*) is 
allocated to forest.  Denote the probability of low quality land as po.  Expected market returns to 
agriculture and forestry on low quality lands are denoted  
and , where .  Likewise, expected market returns to agriculture and 
forestry on high quality lands are denoted   and , 
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*) or low quality range (q≤q
*), the parcel-specific value of q is unobservable.  
A landscape with a probability of low quality land equal to po can have many potential 
spatial configurations of land quality and forest.  The expected share of core forest on a 
landscape in which forest is randomly distributed equals the probability of three adjacent low-
quality parcels, po
3. However, if the equilibrium share of a landscape in core forest is observable, 
then we can compute it directly as Co.  The degree of fragmentation expected on a randomly 
distributed landscape can be related to fragmentation on the actual landscape as βo=Co/ po
3.  The parameter βo denotes the ratio of the actual share of the landscape in core forest to the expected 
share of the landscape in core forest from a randomly distributed landscape.  For notational 
simplicity we assume that the share of a randomly distributed landscape in core forest (βo=1) 
represents the minimum probability of a core parcel and the maximum degree of fragmentation.
5 
While this assumption eases notation below, it does not alter the intuition of the results.  The 
parameter βo has an upper bound
6 equal to po
-2.   
The expected social benefit from an equilibrium landscape of N parcels defined in section 
2 is observable and equal to: 
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Since parcel-specific q is unobservable, the problem is to choose the aggregate amount of land to 
convert to forest that maximizes the sum of expected market and non-market returns on the 
landscape.  We assume that the regulator uses an incentive-based mechanism such as an 
afforestation subsidy to increase the amount of land converted to forest.  Let pc be the share of 
the landscape which the regulator converts from agriculture to forest, resulting in a share of 
forestland of p= po+pc.  By definition, all land converted to forest will be high quality since all 
low quality land will already be forested.  Converting land to forest will increase the share of the 
landscape in core forest because converting land to forest increases the probability that every 
forest parcel has neighboring forest parcels, regardless of where the new forest is located.  For 
example, if βo=1 and pc>0 then the probability of a core parcel will be p
3>po
3.   Generally, the 
                                                 
5 If po≤0.5 the lower bound of βo corresponds to the case where no parcels are core and βo
L=0. If po>0.5, then at least 
one parcel must be core and the lower bound of βo on a landscape with N parcels is βo
L=(2(po-0.5)-1/N).  
6 The upper bound of βo will correspond to a landscape with minimum fragmentation (e.g. all forestland is clustered 
into one patch).  In this case the probability that a randomly selected parcel on a large landscape will be core forest 
will equal po.  In other words, if all forest is clustered then the probability that a forest parcel has neighboring forest 
parcels equals one.  So the maximum value of βo will equal po
-2 and the minimum value of βo will occur on a random 
landscape where β=1. 
 share of the reforested landscape in core habitat will depend on the spatial configuration of land 
quality, denoted γ for simplicity, and will be a function of βo, pc, po, and γ as follows: 
β(βo,po,pc,γ)
.(po+pc)
3.  While βo, pc, and po are ex-ante observable, γ is not, and thus the share of 
the reforested landscape in core habitat is ex-ante unknown.  
The regulator’s problem is to choose the optimal amount of agricultural land to convert to 
forest to maximize the expected social benefits from the landscape:   
o c
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For notational simplicity, define  as the ratio of opportunity costs of 
conversion on high quality parcels to the maximum core benefits from conversion on a random 
landscape.  Proposition 1 presents the solution to the regulator’s problem and answers the first 
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Proposition 1: Suppose a regulator knows the distribution of low quality land po and the initial 
clustering parameter βo. Then the solution to the regulator’s conservation problem (2) is: 
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Proof: See appendix. 
 
With incomplete information the regulator should either reforest nothing on the equilibrium 
landscape (i.e. pc =0) or cluster every parcel into a forested use (i.e. pc =1-po).  A corner solution 
is optimal because (2) is a convex function of the share of converted forestland pc (see appendix 
for proof).  The convexity of (2) in pc is due to core forest benefits and arises because a) core 
forest benefits are a function of the spatial adjacency of forest parcels, and b) the exact spatial location of restored forestland is ex-ante unknown.
7 As the share of the landscape in forest 
increases, the probability of each forest parcel having a neighboring forest parcel increases at an 
increasing rate.  
The point po= p  is the switching point between the corner solutions.  It represents the 
share of low quality land at which the expected benefits of clustering every parcel in forest 
exceed the expected benefits of reforesting nothing on the equilibrium landscape.  The 
probability of low quality land is crucial in determining the switching point because it represents 
the probability of spatially adjacent forestland.  The switching point  p  is an implicit function of 
∆ and βo.  Implicit differentiation reveals 0 > ∆ ∂ ∂p  and  0 > ∂ ∂ o p β  (see appendix for proof). 
So, the less fragmented the initial landscape, the lower the net benefits from reforestation and the 
higher the switching point between corner solutions, ceteris paribus.  Likewise, higher values of 
∆ imply an increased opportunity cost of forest conversion, increasing the value of  p  and 
decreasing the likelihood of clustering as an optimal solution.    
  The corner solution to (2) was derived with the assumption of a one-dimensional 
landscape, although it can be easily shown that a corner solution holds for a two-dimensional 
landscape.  To show this, note that in the two dimensional case, the only component of (2) that 
changes is the share of the landscape in core forest.  For example, if we let parcel i have non-zero 
core forest benefits if and only if its eight immediate neighbors are forested, then specifying (2) 
in two dimensions doesn’t affect the key feature of the model, namely the convexity of core 
forest benefits in pc.  Therefore, (2) would still be convex in pc and a corner solution would still 
                                                 
7 If the regulator knows the spatial configuration of land quality and can select where to locate new forestland, then 
an interior solution with some level of fragmentation is possible. This case is discussed in section 4. be optimal.
8  In fact, since it takes more adjacent parcels to create a core forest parcel in two 
dimensions, the regulator’s expected benefit function becomes more convex than the one-
dimensional case.   
In the above analysis we also assume that the costs of converting agricultural land to 
forest are linear.  If the costs of conversion are increasing at a decreasing rate, or increasing at a 
rate slower than core forest benefits, then the corner solution would still hold.  However, if the 
costs of conversion are increasing in pc at a faster rate than core forest benefits, then an interior 
solution is possible.  More specifically, marginal core forest benefits would have to be equal to 
marginal costs at some value of pc>0 such that po+pc<1, and marginal costs of conversion would 
have to be increasing faster than marginal core forest benefits at some value of pc’ >pc.  Note that 
an interior solution is less likely in the two-dimensional case because core forest benefits are 
more convex than in the one-dimensional case.   
3.2 Targeting Conservation Efforts 
We now explore the second major question posed above, that is, on which types of 
landscapes should the regulator target conservation efforts?  The expected net social benefits of 
the regulator’s optimal solution, NB
*, can be derived by subtracting (1) from (2) and substituting 
the regulator’s optimal solution to p
c, which gives us equations (3) and (4) below.  NB
* is 
defined as a function of po, ∆, and βo.   
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* behaves as a function of po and βo is the same as exploring how NB
* 
behaves with alternative assumptions of spatial heterogeneity
9.  First, we explore how NB
* will 
                                                 
8 The switching point would be different between one and two dimensions. change with po for a given level of βo. It is easy to show that for a given βo, NB
* is concave in po 
for po≥ p  and reaches a maximum point at o o p β /
* ∆ = .  In words, the landscape whose 
equilibrium is furthest from the optimum is the landscape whose share of low quality land is 
equal to o β / ∆ .  Another way to write this rule is ; which states that the 
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*.  Figure 1 presents graphs of 
p=po+pc and NB
* against po for the simple case where βo=1, and for alternative values of ∆. 
The net benefit curves in figure 1 have several features worthy of discussion.  First, note 
that when po< p  the equilibrium landscape is optimal and NB
*=0 because the corner solution 
pc=1-po yields lower net benefits than pc=0.  Second, to explain the increasing portion of the 
curves, note that marginal benefits of forest conversion increase at an increasing rate with po.  
Therefore, the opportunity cost of creating a new core parcel relative to expected benefits is high 
at values of po close to p .  However, as land quality becomes less heterogeneous (e.g. higher 
values of po), it is more likely for clusters of low quality land to form, and at moderate levels of 
heterogeneity marginal benefits of forest conversion are higher relative to opportunity costs than 
at values of po close to  p . Third, to explain the decreasing portion of the curve, note that on 
landscapes which are mostly homogeneous (e.g. po =0.95), almost the entire equilibrium 
landscape is forested and is thus likely to be close to the optimum.  So, there will be few sub-
optimal parcels on the equilibrium landscape when land quality is mostly homogeneous, and 
therefore NB
* will be low.  In summary, the shape of NB
* reflects a tradeoff between the 
marginal and aggregate net benefits of reforestation.  At higher values of po, marginal benefits of 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 In particular, define heterogeneity in land quality as the number of edges between high and low quality land. The 
probability that any particular high quality parcel has an edge with a low quality parcel is equal to po(1-po). So the 
number of edges on the landscape equals Npo(1-po), which is a strictly concave function of po with a maximum at 
p=0.5.  Therefore, maximum spatial heterogeneity occurs on landscapes with values of po close to 0.5, and 
landscapes become more homogeneous as po approaches either 1 or 0. converting a randomly selected parcel to forest are high relative to marginal cost because of the 
increased likelihood of spatially adjacent forest.  However, the set of parcels available for 
conversion becomes lower at higher values of po, implying low levels of aggregate net benefits. 
Targeting conservation resources to landscapes where po= o β / ∆ will yield the highest 
net social gains.  In addition, figure 1 shows that reducing the value of core forest relative to 
opportunity cost (e.g. increasing ∆) shifts NB
* down, and shifts the maximum point and  p  to the 
right.  One implication is that equilibrium landscapes with lower opportunity costs of conversion 
are likely to be further from the optimum.  Therefore, focusing a fragmentation policy on 
landscapes with lower opportunity costs of conversion is likely to yield larger welfare gains than 
focusing on landscapes with higher opportunity costs.  A second implication is that the value of 
po which maximizes NB
* will be lower on landscapes with lower opportunity costs of conversion 
relative to core forest values.  So, the lower the social value of a core forest parcel, the more 
conservation efforts should shift to landscapes with more low quality land, and more equilibrium 
forestland.   
  In order to compare the net social benefits of two landscapes with different levels of βo 
we derive iso-net benefit curves to analyze combinations of po and βo which yield identical net 
social benefits.  We construct these curves for landscapes with po greater than the switching point 
p  and thus focus on combinations of po and βo which yield a given level of NB
*.  For a constant 
NB
*, differentiating (4) with respect to βo yields ) ( 3 |
2 2
0 o o o dNB o o p p p O β β − ∆ = ∂ ∂
= .  Since po
2 is 
always positive,  0 |
0> ∂ ∂
=
O dNB o o p β  if  o β / ∆ > po and 0 |
0< ∂ ∂
=
O dNB o p β  if  o β / ∆ < po.  The 
NB
* for landscapes with different combinations of equilibrium forest (po) and equilibrium 
fragmentation levels (βo) can be compared using the iso-net benefit curves in figure 2.  For example, consider the two landscapes (1 and 2) marked in figure 2 with the following properties: 
p1>p2 and β1< β2.  Since points on iso-net benefit curves closer to the left side of figure 3 have 
higher net social benefits we can see that landscape 1 has higher net social benefits than 
landscape 2.  Examination of figure 2 highlights that reforesting landscapes with more 
fragmentation yields unambiguously higher net benefits than reforesting landscapes with less 
fragmentation, ceteris paribus.  However, reforesting equilibrium landscapes with more forest 
may or may not yield higher net benefits than reforesting landscapes with less forest.  If 
po<(>) o β / ∆ , then reforesting equilibrium landscapes with more forest will yield larger 
(smaller) net benefits than reforesting landscapes with less forest, ceteris paribus.   
  The regulator should always target landscapes with (βo, po) close to (1, ∆ ).  The value 
(βo
*, po
*) equal to (1, ∆ ) is the solution to the problem of maximizing net social benefits from 
reforestation rather than total expected benefits.  While the regulator’s optimal reforestation 
strategy is to convert all land to forest on landscapes in which the expected benefits of doing so 
are positive, the net social benefits of this strategy vary considerably depending on the amount 
and spatial configuration of equilibrium forestland.  Therefore, efforts to reduce fragmentation 
should be targeted to the most fragmented landscapes with an aggregate amount of forest equal 
to a threshold, defined by the ratio of the opportunity cost of conversion to the social value of 
core forest.  This threshold represents the point at which every parcel converted has a high 
enough probability of adjacent forestland to generate positive expected net benefits. 
3.3 Landscape Simulations 
If the regulator knows the spatial configuration of land quality, then they can simply 
solve the optimization problem directly for each landscape.  We hypothesize that the average net 
benefits of the optimal landscape observed across multiple assumptions of the spatial configuration of land quality for each given po will have properties that match the net benefit 
curve found in section 3.2. We use simulation methods and neutral landscape models
10 to explore 
the net benefits of an optimal landscape across multiple assumptions of the spatial configuration 
of land quality and to test the insights derived above.  We use a neutral landscape model on a 
two-dimensional 14x14 grid where each parcel has a probability po of having low land quality 
land and probability (1-po) of having high quality land.
11  By altering po we can use random 
number generators to simulate a rich variety of potential spatial configurations of land quality.   
Our simulation model works in the following way.  First, we parameterize core benefits B 
and market returns to land for both uses such that and .  Core benefits B will be 
non-zero for a parcel if and only if all eight neighboring parcels are forested.  These parameters 
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o and generate a 
random number on each parcel to create a spatial configuration of land quality across the two-
dimensional landscape.  If the random number generated for parcel (i,j) is less than po then this 
parcel is assigned to be low quality land.  Next, we calculate the value of the equilibrium 
landscape with the following equation: 
∑∑
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Third, we solve the regulator’s problem using integer programming with a branch-and-bound 
solution algorithm.  Once the regulator’s problem is solved, we calculate the value of the optimal 
landscape using the above equation and then calculate NB
*.  Fourth, we vary po between 0.05 
and 0.95 in intervals of 0.05, and simulate 100 potential landscapes for each value of po. For each 
                                                 
10 Neutral landscape models are used extensively in landscape ecology and consist of random maps which lack all 
factors that might organize or structure the pattern of the landscape (e.g. Gardner et al. 1987).  Random maps are 
typically organized into grids with two primary types of land use, where each parcel in the landscape has a specified 
probability of being in one of the two uses.   
11 The size 14x14 was chosen due to computational limitations.  landscape simulation we solve the regulator’s problem and calculate the net benefits of the 
optimal landscape, and then take the mean of all simulations for each value of po.  This results in 
a total of 1900 potential configurations of land quality.  The following parameters are used for 
market returns to the two land uses:  =2;  =3;  =1;  =4.   As discussed above, the 
optimal landscape is also a function of the opportunity cost of converting a high quality parcel to 
forest relative to the social value of core forest (∆).  Therefore we run the simulations with 
different relative values of core forest parcels.  This simulation model is a direct test of the model 










po as po is altered from 0.05 to 0.95.  
Examination of figure 3 indicates that the properties of the simulated net benefit function 
are largely consistent with the analytical net benefit function presented in 3.2. First, there is a 
non-linear relationship between the net benefits of the optimal landscape and the probability of 
low quality land.  When core benefits are modest, NB
* first increases as land quality becomes 
less heterogeneous and then decreases as land quality becomes completely homogeneous.  
Second, decreasing the social value of a core parcel relative to the opportunity cost of converting 
a high quality parcel to forest (e.g. increasing ∆) shifts the net benefits curve down and the 
maximum point to the right.  Third, the value of po which maximizes the simulated net benefit 
function is close in value to the point predicted analytically.  In two dimensions, the probability 
of a random parcel being core is equal to Bpo




H − = ∆ o 
which maximizes NB
* occurs when po =∆
1/8.  When ∆=0.15, the maximum value of NB
* should 
occur at po =0.79, whereas the simulations place this point at approximately po =0.8.  When 
∆=0.25 the maximum value of NB
* should occur at po =0.84, whereas the simulations place this 
point at approximately po =0.85.  So the value of po which maximizes NB
* in the simulations is largely consistent with that predicted by the analytical results and the simulated landscapes 
confirm the major analytical insights.  
4. Optimal Forest Landscapes with Urban Land  
In this section we consider optimal landscapes when urban development is the primary 
cause of fragmentation.  We present two models of urban development with spatial externalities.  
In the first model, the net return to developed land depends on its distance to the central business 
district (CBD)-- as assumed extensively in the urban economics literature (e.g. Mills 1981; 
Capozza and Helsley 1989)-- and distance to an exogenous amenity (e.g. a scenic hill) outside of 
the city boundary (Wu and Plantinga 2003).  In the second model urban returns are a declining 
function of distance to the CBD and a function of the developed status of each parcel’s 
immediate neighbors (e.g. Turner 2004).  In each model we assume two uses to land, urban (u) 
and forest (f), but, in contrast to section 3, we assume that distances are observable and therefore 
parcel-specific land quality is known by the regulator.  We consider the equilibrium landscape 
and compare it with the optimal landscape when core forest benefits are valuable.  We then 
develop simple incentive policies to achieve the optimal landscape for each model.  Denote Z = 
{1,…,N} as the set of parcels on the landscape where z∈Z is a particular location with distance z 
from the CBD. Implicitly, z=0 locates the CBD while each subsequent location is one-unit 
distance further from the CBD.  Before we present the models, consider the following definitions 
of terms used in this section.  
Definition: Development on parcel z is considered leapfrog if parcels z-1 and z+1 are 
undeveloped.  Development on parcel z is considered in-fill if parcels z-1 and z+1 are 
developed.  
 Leapfrog development is defined as development which occurs outside the city boundary where 
neither immediate neighbor is urban.  In-fill development is defined as urban development on a 
parcel adjacent to two urban parcels.   
Since the regulator knows the spatial configuration of land quality they can explicitly 
select a land use on each parcel {δ1, δ2,…., δN} to solve the following: 
{}
)] , , ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( [ 1 1
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The regulator’s decision is dependent on market returns to urban and forestry on each 
parcel i relative to the wildlife benefits generated by i being forested.  If parcel i is converted 
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The marginal benefit for parcel i is highest when its immediate four neighbors are all forested.  If 
parcel i’s immediate four neighbors are forested then conversion of parcel i into forest creates 
three new core parcels.   
4.1 Central City with Heterogeneous Amenities 
  Assume the quality of land as an urban lot is measured by its distance to an urban center 
and its distance to an exogenous amenity.  Land quality q is a decreasing function of distance to 
the CBD (located at z=0) and the amenity (located at z=ZA).  Figure 4a illustrates this landscape 
graphically in one-dimension, where market returns to urban are above market returns to forest 
in two distinct ranges: 0≤z≤z
*, and zAL≤z≤zAH.  Wu and Plantinga (2003) show the conditions which generate the urban bid-rent function shown in figure 4a.  Proposition 2 presents conditions 
for the equilibrium and optimal landscapes. 
Proposition 2: Consider a landscape where land quality satisfies the central city with an amenity 
assumption. L
* is the equilibrium landscape and L
** is the optimal landscape with the following 
characteristics: 
1.  L
* consists of a fragmented set of urban parcels U
* and a fragmented set of forest parcels 
F
*. 
2.  If , then L B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) ( ) 0 , ( + > ≤
** consists of a contiguous (fragmented) set of urban 
parcels U
** and a contiguous (fragmented) set of forest parcels F
**. 
3.  ,   and TB(L
* * * U U ⊂




Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium landscape consists of fragmented sets of both urban and 
forest parcels.  Urban parcels are found clustered near the CBD and clustered near the amenity.  
It is the inclusion of preferences for living near an amenity outside the city which results in a 
fragmented landscape. Fragmentation may be socially optimal when amenities influence urban 
land values.  If urban returns at the amenity exceed forest returns plus benefits from three core 
parcels, then social welfare is higher with at least one urban lot outside the city.   The social 
value of three core parcels is the point of comparison rather than the value of one parcel because 
conversion of the first parcel at ZA from forest to urban would result in a loss of three core 
parcels rather than one.  If urban returns at the amenity are less than forest returns plus benefits 
from three core parcels, then social welfare is highest with no fragmentation.  The optimal city 
boundary (z
**) is closer to the CBD than the equilibrium city boundary (z
*)— z
**<z
* — and the 
optimal urban region centered near the amenity is always smaller than the equilibrium urban area 
centered near the amenity.  Therefore, the equilibrium forest area is never greater than the 
optimal forest area and total core benefits on the equilibrium landscape are never larger than total 
core benefits on the optimal landscape.  Proposition 2 presents an incentive policy to achieve the 
optimal landscape L
**. Proposition 3: Consider a landscape where land quality satisfies the central city with an amenity 
assumption.  The following policy will achieve the socially optimal landscape configuration L
**: 
1.  A development impact fee (subsidy) of B on non-leapfrog development (non-core 
forest parcels). 
2.  A development impact fee (subsidy) of 3B on leapfrog development (core forest 
parcels). 
 
A spatially-uniform incentive of one would achieve the optimal city boundary z
**, but would fail 
to keep land around the amenity forested if .  If   then this 
land is optimally forested and a uniform policy doesn’t provide the correct incentive.  This 
problem arises because leapfrog development has a larger effect on fragmentation than 
development at the city boundary.  Our proposed optimal incentive policy is coined the ‘punish-
the-leapfrogger’ policy.  The incentive offered to landowners is contingent on the land use of 
their neighbors.  An impact fee of one is imposed on development adjacent to an urban use, 
while an impact fee of three is assessed to leapfrog development.  Thus, leapfrog developers 
must internalize the large initial impact on fragmentation.  If  the landowner 
at Z
B R z R
f
A
u + > ) 0 , ( B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + ≤
B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + >
A will pay the tax and develop at ZA.  Each subsequent developer near the amenity is a profit-
maximizer and will locate adjacent to the first ‘leapfrogger’ to avoid paying the extra fee.  
If , the tax will remove the incentive for anyone to ‘leapfrog’ and the land 
around the amenity will optimally remain forested. 
B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + ≤
If there were no amenity outside of the city boundary then there would be no 
fragmentation in either the equilibrium or optimal landscapes.  Since the bid rent function for 
urban returns is monotonically decreasing from the CBD, all z≤z
* would be urban while all z>z
* 
would be forested in the equilibrium landscape, where z
* is defined by R
u(z
*)=R
f.  Consideration 
of core benefits would only imply that the optimal city boundary (z
**) is closer to the CBD than 
in the equilibrium landscape, identical to the optimal boundary in proposition 2.  The policy 
presented in proposition 3 would achieve the optimal landscape if there were no amenity present, although a simple Pigouvian incentive (tax or subsidy) of B would also achieve the socially 
optimal landscape.  This is not surprising given that there is no fragmentation in the equilibrium 
landscape and only those urban parcels closest to the equilibrium city edge (z
*) are not optimal. 
4.2 Central city with neighbor preferences 
  An alternative model of urban rents which yields a fragmented landscape is developed by 
Turner (2004).  In Turner’s model, fragmentation results from household’s preference for open 
space (undeveloped land around the house).  Land quality in this model is a declining function of 
distance to the CBD and a function of whether each parcel’s immediate neighbors are 
undeveloped.   In particular, urban rents for parcel z are raised by ρ if and only if z-1 and z+1 are 
forested (figure 4b).   
Turner (2004) analyzes the equilibrium and optimal landscapes under this model with no 
core forest benefits, and we briefly review his results.  When neighbor preferences are valuable 
and core forest benefits are not, both the equilibrium and optimal landscapes consist of an urban, 
suburban, and forested region.   Turner shows that in the equilibrium landscape, all z<z
* are 
urban parcels, all z>z
** are forest parcels, and all z
*≤z≤z
** are suburban parcels that alternate 
between forest and urban uses, where z
* and z






f.  The 
suburban region is half forested but has no core forest benefits because no forest parcel is 
adjacent to another forest parcel.  When neighbor preferences for open space are valuable, forest 
parcels exude a positive externality on urban parcels due to the proximity of such parcels to open 
space.  Thus, when neighbor preferences exist, if agent A locates next to agent B, then A 
imposes a negative externality on B by depriving them of what was previously open space.  As a 
consequence, parcels are placed in an urban use in the equilibrium landscape that should, in an 
optimal landscape, be left as forest.  The primary difference between the equilibrium and optimal landscapes is that urban developers internalize their externalities in the optimal landscape by 
including their neighbor’s loss of open space benefits as a cost.  Thus, the urban area is too large 
in the equilibrium landscape and the suburban area is too small.  Optimally, the set of parcels 
{ }
* * : N N z z z U < ∈  should be urban, the set of parcels { }
* * * * : z z z z S N N ≤ ≤ ∈  should be suburban, 
and the set { }
* * * : z z z FN > ∈  should be forested.  Of particular importance in Turner’s analysis is 
that in-fill development is not optimal.   
  The presence of core benefits can significantly impact the optimal landscape 
configuration with neighbor preferences.  Proposition 4 presents the optimal landscape with 
neighbor preferences and core benefits.  In this landscape forest parcels exude a positive 
externality to both neighboring urban parcels and neighboring forest parcels. 
Proposition 4: Consider a landscape where benefits from core forests are positive and where 




1.  If ρ>B,   consists of a contiguous urban region  , a suburban region   
where forest and urban uses are fragmented, and a contiguous forest region  , 
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2.  If ρ<B (ρ=B),  consists of a contiguous urban region  , a contiguous forest region 
, and no suburban region  , where  ,   is a null 
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There are two primary points to emphasize from proposition 4.  First, whether suburban 
development is optimal depends critically on the relative magnitude of ρ and B.  If ρ>B, then the 
open space benefit exceeds the value of one core forest parcel and the optimal landscape will 
include an urban, suburban, and a forested region, where fragmentation is optimal in the 
suburban region.  Note that for at least one suburban parcel to be optimal then urban returns at the closest suburban parcel to the optimal city edge must exceed
12 R
f+2B.  The value of two core 
parcels is the point of comparison here because wildlife benefits generated by converting the 
furthest suburban parcel from the optimal city edge to forest are equal to 2B.  If ρ≤B, then 
benefits from one core parcel exceed the open space benefits.  In this case it is not optimal to 
have a suburban region, and therefore any level of fragmentation is sub-optimal.  In addition, if ρ 
is strictly less than B, then the equilibrium city boundary is too far from the CBD, similar to the 
finding in the central city with amenities model.  When ρ<B then it will not be optimal to have a 
suburban region and thus core benefits can be achieved by moving the optimal city boundary 
closer to the CBD.  The size of the optimal forest region is never smaller than the equilibrium 
forest region and the size of the optimal urban region is never larger than the equilibrium urban 
region.  Proposition 5 presents the optimal incentive policy for the central city with neighbor 
preferences model. 
Proposition 5: Consider a landscape where benefits from core forests are positive and where 




1.  If ρ≤B, impose a uniform impact fee (subsidy) of B on all developers (forest 
landowners).  
2.  If ρ>B, impose an impact fee (subsidy) of 2B on all leapfrog developers (core forest 
owners) and an impact fee (subsidy) of ρ on in-fill developers (non-core forest 
owners).  
 
The design of the optimal incentive policy is conditional on the relative magnitude of ρ and B.  If 
ρ≤B a simple Pigouvian incentive policy is optimal.  The incentive could be a spatially-uniform 
fee or subsidy equal to B, and urban development will only occur on parcel z if R
u(z)>R
f+B.  It 
will never be optimal for a landowner to develop a suburban parcel under such a policy and the 
optimal landscape will be achieved.  In contrast, if ρ>B a simple Pigouvian incentive policy no 
longer works.  The optimal policy will have to internalize the positive externalities of forest on 
                                                 
12 If ρ>B, then urban returns on this parcel will exceed R
f+2B (see appendix for proof). both neighboring urban and forest parcels.  The fee of ρ is equal to the open space benefits to 
urban uses while the fee of 2B represents the wildlife benefits generated by the furthest suburban 
parcel from the CBD being converted to forest.   This spatially-varying policy will result in the 
optimal landscape. 
  An important point to emphasize after considering these alternative models of urban 
developments is that spatial heterogeneity in land quality greatly influences the optimality of 
fragmentation in land use and the choice of policy incentives.  When land quality is not very 
heterogeneous, such as in a simple central city model with no amenities, then fragmentation is 
never optimal and simple Pigouvian incentives can be used to achieve the optimal landscape.  
However, as land quality becomes more heterogeneous, the likelihood of fragmentation being 
optimal increases.  In addition, simple Pigouvian incentive policies may no longer lead to the 
optimal landscape and the spatial properties of the optimal incentive policy become more 
complex as land quality becomes more spatially heterogeneous.  An agglomeration bonus is one 
such policy approach (Smith and Shogren 2002).  Our results highlight how the design of an 
efficient agglomeration bonus must account for spatial heterogeneity in land quality. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a spatially-explicit model of land use to examine optimal 
landscape configuration and policy design when wildlife habitat fragmentation affects the social 
value of land-use.  The optimal spatial configuration of forest depends on the spatial distribution 
of land quality, and therefore we develop optimal policies for reducing fragmentation that 
explicitly account for land quality information.  Since land quality for urban and agricultural land 
use is influenced by different factors, policy insights are developed for the cases of forest 
fragmentation caused by urban development and by agriculture.  In particular, we assume urban land quality is a function of observable distances to cities and amenities while agricultural land 
quality is a function of soil quality and other unobserved parcel-specific attributes.  
In the case of forest fragmentation caused by agriculture, we derive the optimal amount 
of forest restoration when land quality information is incomplete and the regulator doesn’t know 
the spatial location of restored forestland a priori.  Results indicate two possibilities: convert all 
agricultural land to forest or convert nothing to forest.  This corner solution is driven by the 
spatial relationships giving rise to fragmentation and the uncertainty as to the exact location of 
restored forestland.  In particular, as the probability of every parcel being forest increases, the 
probability of every parcel being adjacent to other forest parcels increases at an increasing rate.  
The net social benefits of the optimal reforestation strategy are shown to vary significantly across 
landscapes with different amounts of forest, fragmentation, and opportunity costs of conversion.  
This variation in net social benefits gives rise to targeting rules to guide conservation efforts 
across multiple landscapes with differing degrees of landscape heterogeneity.  In general, efforts 
to reduce fragmentation should be targeted to the most fragmented landscapes with an aggregate 
share of forest equal to a threshold, defined by the ratio of the opportunity cost of conversion to 
the social value of core forest.  In addition, a fragmentation policy will yield higher welfare gains 
if targeted towards landscapes with lower opportunity costs of conversion.   
When urban development is the primary cause of fragmentation, the aggregate amount of 
forestland is higher on the optimal landscape than on the equilibrium landscape under all 
assumptions of land quality.  However, the spatial clustering of land use will not always yield the 
highest social welfare, as some level of fragmentation may be optimal.  While fragmentation is 
never optimal on simple landscapes such as predicted in central city models, spatial 
heterogeneity in amenities or household preferences for open space can lead to an optimal level of fragmentation.  Under the simple central city model a spatially uniform incentive policy (e.g. a 
development impact fee) can achieve the optimal landscape because only the location of the city 
edge is not optimal.  However, a uniform policy does not necessarily achieve the optimal 
landscape in the presence of spatial heterogeneity in amenities or household preferences for open 
space.  When an exogenous amenity exists outside the city boundary, a policy which punishes 
the first leapfrog developer outside the city will achieve the optimal landscape. When urban land 
quality is also a function of neighboring uses, the optimal policy will offer varying incentives to 
developers depending on whether they engage in ‘in-fill’ or ‘leapfrog’ development.  These 
results arise because urban development generates a larger increase in fragmentation if it occurs 
outside the city boundary rather than at the city edge.  References 
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  Figure 4 – Market Returns to Land  
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** Appendix: Proofs  
 
Proof of Lemma: If L is fragmented with configuration L’, then  
Max TC(L’) = { Nf –3 if δN=1 
  {  Nf -4 if δN<1 
 
Therefore, TC(L) > max TC(L’)▪ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
First, we prove that equation (4) is convex in p
c. If βo=1, the initial landscape is random 
and 0 ) ( 6
2 2 > + = ∂ ∂ o c c
O p Bp p EB .  If βo≠1 then the initial landscape is non-random.  To prove 
that (4) is convex in p
c when βo≠1, subdivide the non-random landscape into S random sub-
landscapes such that the following properties hold: 1) there are i=1,…,S sub-landscapes; 2) each 
sub-landscape i has si percent of the initial landscape L; 3) po
i denotes the probability of low 
quality land (e.g. forest) on sub-landscape i; 4)  ; 5) expected core benefits from a 
parcel of land on sub-landscape i is equal to . The core benefits on the landscape will 
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) 1 ( ) 1 ( α .  Therefore, the 
probability of a forested parcel on sub-landscape i after conversion is equal 
to , and expected core benefits from the entire landscape can be written as 
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o i c s p s p s B p EB α α .  Therefore, (4) is convex in pc. 
 
Since (4) is convex in pc we can only have a corner solution to (4): pc =0 or pc =1-po.  If pc =1-po 
then β=1.  The point at which it is optimal to switch from pc =0 to pc =1-po can be derived by 
examining the point po=pL at which the expected benefits from solution pc =1-po exceed the 
expected benefits from solution pc =0. This can be expressed by examining when the following 
equation equals zero:  
) 1 )( ( ] 1 [ ) 0 ( ) 1 (





H o o c o c p R R p B p EB p p EB NB − − − − = = − − = = β  
First, note that when po=1, βo=1 by assumption, and NB
*=0.  Second, note 
that 0 6
2 * 2 ≤ − = ∂ ∂ o o o p p NB β , because po≥0 and βo≥0 by assumption.  Therefore, NB
* is 
always concave in the relevant range po≥0 and there can be at most two positive values of po for 
which NB
*=0, including po=1. Thus,  } , 1 min{
*
p p = is the implicit solution to NB
*=0.     
 
Using implicit differentiation on NB
*=0 we can derive ) ( 3 /
2 3
p p p o o β β − ∆ = ∂ ∂ .   In order to 
sign this derivative note that NB
* is concave in po and maximized when βopo
2=∆.  Therefore, ∆> βo
3pL
2 and 0 > ∂ ∂ o p β .  Also, using implicit differentiation on NB
*=0 we can 
derive ) ( ) 1 (
2
∆ − − = ∆ ∂ ∂ p p p o L β .  Since we already showed that 
2
p o β > ∆ , 
then 1 0 < ∀ > ∆ ∂ ∂ p p .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
1.  By definition, R
u(z)>R
f at all locations z≤z
* and  AH AL z z z ≤ ≤ , thus profit 
maximizing landowners will place these lands in urban uses and the rest in forest. 
2.  Suppose  and it is not optimal for all locations z>z B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + ≤
* to be 
forested.  Then since R
u(zA,0) > R
u(z,0) ∀z>z
*, a configuration L’ that consists of all parcels 
z<z
** and parcel zA in an urban use and all other parcels in forested use should have a higher 
total welfare than L
**. However, converting the parcel at location zA to forest creates core 
benefits of 3B, and since   by assumption, a Pareto improvement could be 
had by converting the parcel at location z
B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + <
A to forest.  Thus, if the parcel at location zA should be 
forested, then so should all z>z
*. 
If , all locations z≤z B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + >
** and   are in urban use U, 
and all locations   and  are in forest use F, where 
. Now, suppose there 
was some other L’ which created social benefits greater than L
* * * *
AH AL z z z ≤ ≤
* * * *
AL z z z < < z zAH <
* *
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**.  Since   
and the central city is located at z=0 (δ
B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + >
0=0), then L’ will be fragmented.  Since δ0=0 by 
assumption, the closest forest parcel to i=0 (δi’) will generate forest benefits of R
f+B, because δi-
1’=0, δ’i+j=1.  Likewise, since the parcel at zA will be in urban then the closest forest parcel z<zA 
will generate forest benefits R
f+B and the closest forest parcel z>zA will also generate forest 
benefits R
f+B.  Therefore any L’ in which some z<z
**, or some   is forested would 
have lower welfare than L
* * * *
AH AL z z z ≤ ≤
**.  

















*,  , and   then L
* *
AL AL z z >
* *
AH AH z z <
** 
must contain more forest than L
*. Therefore, since the landscape is of fixed length and has only 
two uses,  and
* * * U U ⊂
* * * F F ⊂ . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
The policy in proposition 3 would result in the following optimization problem for each 
landowner: 
a. Max δi(R
f+B) + (1- δi)R
u(z)  for parcels adjacent to an urban parcel. 
b. Max δi(R
f) + (1- δi)(R
u(z)-3B) for parcels not adjacent to an urban parcel. 
This setup would result in the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be forested: 
  F o r e s t   i f   R
f+B>R
u(z) for parcels adjacent to an urban parcel. 
  F o r e s t   i f   R
f+3B>R
u(z) for parcels not adjacent to an urban parcel. 
   
Since the CBD is urban, the parcel developing next to the CBD will face the first optimization 
problem above. All subsequent developers then have an incentive to locate next to the original 
urban parcels.  Since R
u(z)>R
f+B for all z≤z
**, then all z≤z
** will be in an urban use, where 
. If , then no parcels z>z B R z z z R
f
A
u + = − |) | , (
* * * * B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + <
** will be developed, because the Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition for urban development will never be satisfied 
since max R
u(q(z)) =   when z> z ) 0 , ( A
u z R
**.  If  , then the Kuhn-Tucker 
necessary condition for urban development will be satisfied for at least parcel z
B R z R
f
A
u 3 ) 0 , ( + >
A, and thus parcel 
zA will be developed. If parcel zA gets developed, then all landowners z>z
* would be better off 
facing maximization problem a than problem b, and would then choose to locate next to the 
existing urban parcels at the amenity. Therefore, all  will have urban returns 
exceeding forest returns and all locations   and  will have forest returns 
exceed urban returns, where 
. Thus, L
* * * *
AH AL z z z ≤ ≤
* * * *
AL z z z < < z zAH <
* *







u + = − = − = − |) | , ( |) | , ( |) | , (
* * * * * * * * * * * * ** will be 
achieved. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
1. ρ>B 
 
If ρ>B the forested region  consists of all locations   which are forested; the suburban 
region   consists of all locations   which alternate between urban and forest 
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If ρ>B, then 2ρ>2B and R
f+2ρ>R












**does not satisfy the conditions above. Then at least one of the following must be 
true: 
a.  There must be some   which should be urban. Conversion of one parcel z’ to 
urban would generate maximum net benefits of R
* * ' NC z z >
u(z’)+ρ-R
f-2B, which is negative because 
R
f+2B>R
u(z’) + ρ by assumption. 
b.  There must be some   such that z’ and z’’ are either adjacent urban 
plots or adjacent forest plots. First, consider the case when there are adjacent urban plots. If 
z’ is converted to forest, then net benefits are R
* * * ' ' ' NC NC z z z z ≤ ≤ ≤
f+ρ-R
u(z’), which is greater than zero because 
R
u(z’)- ρ<R
f by assumption. Second, consider the case where there are adjacent forest plots. 
If z’ is converted to urban, then minimum net benefits are R
u(z’)+ ρ-R
f-2B, which is greater 
than zero because R
u(z’)+ ρ>R
f+2B by assumption. 
c.  There must be some   that should remain in forest. Conversion of one parcel z’ to 
forest would generate no core benefits and would thus generate net benefits of R
* ' NC z z <
f-R
u(z’), 
which is less than zero by assumption.  Conversion of two parcels z’ and z’’, such that z’’ =z’ 




u(z’’).  However, R
u(z’)- ρ>R
u(z’’)- ρ>R




f+ ρ and net benefits of creating this suburban parcel would be negative. 
* * z zNC = by inspection, therefore  . Likewise,   is a smaller region than 
, and therefore  . Lastly,   because 
 
* *
NC N U U =
* * *
NC NC z z z ≤ ≤
* * * z z zN ≤ ≤
* *
NC N S S ⊃
* *
NC N F F ⊂
* *
NC N U U = and  . 
* *
NC N S S ⊃ 
2. ρ≤B 
If ρ≤B then the forested region   consists of all locations   which are forested; the 
suburban region   is a null set; and the urban region   consists of all   which are 
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If ρ≤B, then 2ρ≤2B and R
f+2ρ≤R












**does not satisfy the conditions above. Then at least one of the following must be 
true: 
 
a.  There must be some   which should be urban. Conversion of one parcel z’ to 
urban would generate maximum net benefits of R
* * ' NC z z >
u(z’)+ρ-R
f-2B, which is negative because 
R
f+2B>R
u(z’) + ρ by assumption. 
b.  There must be some   that should remain in forest. Conversion of one parcel z’ to 
forest would generate maximum net benefits of R
* * ' NC z z <
f+B-R
u(z’), which is less than zero by 
assumption.  Conversion of two parcels z’ and z’’, such that z’’ =z’ + 2 would ensure that 







f by assumption, and thus R
u(z’)+R
u(z’’)>2R
f+ ρ and net 
benefits of creating this suburban parcel would be negative. 
 
* * z zNC < by inspection, therefore . Likewise,   and therefore   is an empty 
set. Lastly,   because   and   is an empty set. 
* *
NC N U U ⊃
* * *




NC N F F ⊂
* *




Proof of Proposition 5:  
1. Assume ρ≤B. Then all landowners face the following optimization problems:  
Max δi(R
f+B) + (1- δi)R
u(z) if at least one neighbor is urban 
This setup would result in the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be forest: 
  Forest if R
f+B>R
u(z) if at least one neighbor is urban 




u u u R z R z R z R = − = + = ρ ρ ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * f u R z R > + ρ ) (f
*<z<z
**, which is the privately optimal suburban region (e.g. the only region for which ρ>0).  
However since ρ≤B, then R
f+B>R




f for all z>z
*. Therefore, 




Each landowner will face the above optimization problem all z≤z
* since R
u(z)>R
f in this range. 
Therefore, the urban forest boundary will occur where R
f+B=R
u(z), which by assumption occurs 






2. Assume ρ>B. Then all landowners face the following optimization problems: 
a. Max δiR
f + (1- δi)(R
u(z)+ρ-2B) if the parcel is a leapfrogger. 
b. Max δiR
f + (1- δi)(R
u(z)-ρ) if the parcel is an in-fill. This setup would result in the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions to be forest: 
  Forest if R
f>R
u(z)+ρ-2B if the parcel is a leapfrogger. 
  Forest if R
f>R
u(z)-ρ if the parcel is an in-fill. 
 




u u u R z R z R z R = − = + = ρ ρ ) ( ) ( ) (
* * * * f u R z R > + ρ ) (f
*<z<z
**, which is the privately optimal suburban region (e.g. the only region for which ρ>0).  
So all parcels z<z
* will then face optimization problem b, and the city boundary will be found 
where R
f=R
u(z)-ρ, which occurs at z= . This corresponds with the socially optimal urban 
boundary. Each leapfrogging parcel will face optimization problem b, and the suburban-forest 




u(z)+ρ-2B, which occurs at z= . This corresponds with the 
socially optimal suburban-forest boundary and   is achieved. 
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